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Abstract
This research analyzed whether political leaders make people lie via priming experiments. Priming is a non-conscious and 
implicit memory effect in which exposure to one stimulus affects the response to another. Following priming theories, we 
proposed an innovative concept that people who perceive leaders to be dishonest (such as liars) are likely to lie themselves. 
We designed three experiments to analyze and critically discussed the potential influence of prime effect on lying behavior, 
through the prime effect of French political leaders (including general politicians, presidents and parties). Experiment 1 
discovered that participants with non-politician-prime were less likely to lie (compared to politician-prime). Experiment 
2A discovered that, compared to Hollande-prime, Sarkozy-prime led to lying behavior both in gravity (i.e., bigger lies) and 
frequency (i.e., lying more frequently). Experiment 2B discovered that Republicans-prime yielded an impact on more lying 
behavior, and Sarkozy-prime made such impact even stronger. Overall, the research findings suggest that lying can be trig-
gered by external influencers such as leaders, presidents and politicians in the organizations. Our findings have provided 
valuable insights into organizational leaders and managers in their personnel management practice, especially in the inter-
vention of lying behavior. Our findings also have offered new insights to explain non-conscious lying behavior.
Keywords Dishonesty · Leadership · Lying · Politicians · Priming · Wellbeing
Introduction
Lying is one of the most controversial abilities that humans 
possess. On the one hand, people generally dislike being 
lied to and are keen to interrogate why liars lie. On the other 
hand, people may engage in lying behavior if they believe it 
is necessary and worthy to do so. For instance, scholars have 
discovered that people generally want to maintain a posi-
tive image about themselves and feel good about themselves 
when looking into the mirror, and one of the expedient ways 
to achieve a positive image is lying, e.g., saying something 
not true but still feeling good (ethical dissonance; Ayal and 
Gino 2011; Barkan, Ayal, & Ariely, 2015). Interestingly, 
although virtually all societies have sanction or penalty 
against lying behavior, deception and the ability of lying 
are still essential for polite interaction and self-preservation 
(Serota, Levine & Boster, 2010).
To analyze the motives and mechanism underlying lying, 
scholars have examined the lying behavior through a vari-
ety of perspectives. These perspectives include, for instance, 
development of lying ability (Evans and Lee 2013), inten-
tion and justification of lying (Bok 1999), ubiquity of lying 
(DePaulo 2004), face-to-face vs. computer-mediated lying 
(Hancock, Thom-Santelli, & Ritchie, 2004), lying detection 
ability (Levine, Serota, & Shulman, 2010) and emotional 
inhibitors of lying (Celse, Chang, Max, & Quinton, 2016). 
Lying brings interests to the person who lie (liar), either 
immediately or at a later stage (DePaulo 2004). Liars are 
evaluative and critical about their pay-off of lying, as Becker 
(1968) claim that liars calculate the benefits and risks of 
lying beforehand but only when the pay-off is satisfactory 
can lying behavior emerge. A common thread across the 
aforementioned studies is: lying is a conscious behavior. 
Liars lie because they want to lie.
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Interestingly, however, scholars also suggest that lying 
includes both conscious and unconscious components 
(Hochman, Glockner, Fiedler, & Ayal, 2015). Scholars have 
well studied the phenomenon of conscious lying and pro-
vided valuable insights into the mechanism of lying behav-
ior (e.g., Bok 1999; Evans and Lee 2013), but unconscious 
lying seems to draw limited attention [see exception in Gino 
(2015) research, which discovers that people who value 
morality may still cheat]. Gino’s finding is meaningful as it 
implies a possibility that liars may not be aware of their own 
lying behavior. Specifically, scholars have discovered that 
individual differences are critical to the lying rates and their 
propensity to lie (Serota et al., 2010). Bond and DePaulo 
(2008) report substantial variation in both people’s demea-
nor and people’s ability to lie. Kashy and DePaulo (1996) 
claim that people’s ability to lie successfully may impact 
how often they lie. Celse et al. (2016) suggest that envy 
refrains lying behavior. Taken together, prior studies have 
shown some insights into the view that lying may occur in 
the absence of conscious intervention.
Following this line of research, our project therefore aims 
to examine the possibility of prime-triggered lying. Prime is 
a non-conscious and implicit memory effect in which expo-
sure to one stimulus affects the response to another. Inspired 
by the prime theories, we propose an innovative hypothesis 
that people who perceive politicians to be liars are likely to 
lie themselves. Thus our research aims to examine the link 
between politician-prime and lying behavior, thereby con-
tributing to knowledge of non-conscious lying and will also 
provide suggestions for the intervention of lying behavior.
Theoretical background
Human behaviors are broadly divided into three catego-
ries: consciousness driven, non-consciousness driven, or 
a combination of the two aforementioned. Consciousness-
driven behaviors are resource demanding, as people need 
to mobilize their cognitive resources and these processes 
are often related with individual intentions and controllabil-
ity, i.e., conscious processes tend to operate with individual 
awareness and efforts (Bargh and Chartrand 2000). Non-
consciousness-driven behaviors are automatic, unintentional 
and hence relatively effortless, i.e., non-conscious processes 
tend to operate outside individual awareness (Bargh and 
Williams 2007). Following this logic, lying is viewed as 
a consciousness-driven behavior, as lying is related with 
individual intention and preparation behind it (Becker 1968; 
Kashy and DePaulo 1996). This view is echoed by Gino 
and Mogliner (2014). They indicate that, compared to time, 
contextual factors such as money and power are more likely 
to increase unethical behavior.
Lying could be intervened by conscious inhibitors such 
as corporate ethics, work ethos, honour codes and emo-
tions (Celse et al., 2016; Mazar, Amir, & Ariely, 2008). A 
group of scholars also indicate that moral reminders (e.g., 
religious statements, honor codes) reduce participants’ ten-
dency to lie, by which moral reminders act as a moderator 
in decreasing the frequency of dishonest behavior (Ayal, 
Gino, Barkan, & Ariely, 2015; Shu, Mazar, Gino, Ariely, & 
Bazerman, 2012). Having said this, however, our views are 
different from hose of prior studies. We argue that lying may 
not necessarily occur at the consciousness level, as priming 
studies have provided preliminary support to the possibility 
of lying without individual awareness. To examine the argu-
ment above and the rationale behind, this paper now turns 
to analyze the concept of prime and discuss the prime–lying 
nexus, respectively.
Prime and priming effect
In layman’s term, priming is a non-conscious memory effect, 
in which exposure to one stimulus affects the response to 
another. The construct of priming is crafted by Meyer and 
Schvaneveldt (1971), indicating that human behavior can 
be initiated automatically by presenting relevant situational 
cues with the mediation of non-conscious perceptual or eval-
uative processes. Bargh, Chen and Burrows (1996) continue 
this line of research and suggest that when people behave 
in the same way when exposed to a particular situational 
cue, their behavioral response soon becomes associated with 
the situational cue automatically. Through repeated events, 
the mere presentation of the situational cue is sufficient to 
trigger the corresponding behavior automatically, and the 
situational cue is then described as a prime (Bargh 1996).
Bargh and Chartrand (2000) define priming as passive, 
subtle and unobtrusive activation of relevant mental rep-
resentations by external environmental stimuli, includ-
ing exposure to semantic concepts, short messages, visual 
images and physical sensations. Priming activates temporar-
ily an individual’s mental representation and is concerned 
with examining how “these internal readinesses interact with 
environmental information to produce perceptions, evalua-
tions … motivations and behavior (p. 258)”. That is, priming 
is like a process of activating specific knowledge structures 
incidentally or unobtrusively, which then influences subse-
quent behavior, opinion and judgment outside individual 
awareness. LeBoeuf, Shafir, and Bayuk (2010) have also 
discovered that priming could be adopted as a technique to 
activate people’s mental representations and to examine how 
these representations affect behaviors and attitudes.
Following this logic, we argue that the activation of 
priming is beyond individual consciousness and priming 
effect may lead to behavior in the absence of conscious 
intervention. Our argument may sound bold, but it could 
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be further justified in several ways. First, priming effect can 
be manifested via the principle of ideomotor action (PIA: 
James 1890): simply thinking about an action is sufficient 
to drive the appearance of that movement, unless the person 
consciously engages in efforts to avoid such appearance. A 
good illustration of PIA is supplied by Knuf, Aschersleben 
and Prinz (2001). Their study has found that when watching 
sport video clips, participants tend to perform the move-
ments they see (perceptual induction) or perform movements 
suited to achieve what they would like to see (intentional 
induction). When watching a ball traveling toward a target, 
participants may also move their limbs and tense their mus-
cles in accordance to the movement in the video clips.
Second, priming effect can be clarified via imitation 
effect, i.e., imitation cues may postulate an automatic link 
between perception and behavior; more specifically, percep-
tion of certain behaviors and actions can lead to the perfor-
mance of those actions (Bock 1986; Smeets and Brenner 
1995). A good illustration of imitation effect is available 
from Berkowitz’s experiment, by which aggressive primes 
are found to affect subsequent aggressive behavior. Berkow-
itz (1984) devises a two-stage experiment. At Stage 1, partic-
ipants are primed with the concept of hostility (or neutrality 
in the control condition). At Stage 2, participants are asked 
to punish their partner with electrical shock if their partner 
gives wrong answers (for the sake of research ethics, this 
partner is a virtual computer-acted confederate, rather than 
a real person). Berkowitz has discovered that participants 
with hostility-priming have demonstrated longer shocks to 
the partners than those with neutrality-priming.
Third, we have conducted literature reviews on priming 
and scrutinized its potential influence, but the findings of 
priming effect seem mixed, covering different dimensions 
of human cognition and attitude. For instance, a group of 
researchers indicate that priming effect is linked with intel-
lectual performance (Dijksterhuis and van Knippenberg 
1998), memory (Yoon et al. 2000) and conformity (Epley 
and Gilovich 1999), whereas other scholars suggest that 
priming is found to trigger the attitude of pro-social behavior 
(Abbate, Ruggieri, & Boca, 2013), aggression (Bargh et al. 
1996), competition (Kay, Wheeler, Bargh, & Ross, 2004) 
and dishonesty (Cohn, Fehr, & Maréchal, 2014).
To sum, although scholars have discovered different out-
comes of priming effects, one thing that they jointly agree 
is that activation of priming is beyond individual conscious-
ness. Although studies of PIA and imitation effect differ in 
construct, they have provided preliminary credence to sup-
port our argument that the activation of priming may occur 
in the absence of conscious intervention and priming effect 
may lead to behavior, i.e., the prime–behavior nexus exists.
Prime and lying nexus: the case 
of politician‑priming
Following the discussion above, we hereby adopt a more 
critical perspective to examine the prime–behavior nexus, 
aiming to evaluate whether such nexus is applicable to lying 
behavior. Our questions are: if the answer is affirmative, how 
primes trigger lying behavior? What might be the mecha-
nism behind it? More specifically, what type of primes may 
facilitate lying behavior?
To respond to the first two questions, we have reviewed 
prime-related literature. Nearly three decades ago, schol-
ars began to notice the influence of prime, although the 
concept of priming remained limited. Becker (1968) first 
examined a number of criminal cases and discovered that 
negative constructs (e.g., immoral, dishonest) are associ-
ated with negative behaviors such as defamation, decep-
tion and imposture. Becker interprets these behaviors as 
the consequences of constructed influence, and he analyses 
such influence through economic principles. Becker’s find-
ings may not directly prove the existence of prime–lying 
nexus, but findings do imply that constructs may act as a 
drive to activate the subsequent behavior. More recently, 
Cohen and colleagues conducted a series of studies, analyz-
ing the influence of identity and business context on behav-
ior. Cohn et al. (2013) have found that priming bankers with 
their professional identity increases their dishonest behav-
ior. This is because that bankers generally believe that other 
finance professionals are doing the same things (dishonesty 
behavior), everyone in the finance industry manipulates fig-
ures, so there is no ground for them to act as a red herring. 
Interestingly, Cohn & Maréchal (2015) also have discov-
ered a similar increase in dishonest behaviors in prisoners by 
activating their criminal identity. Simply put, prior studies 
have implied that, when a certain type of prime is activated, 
dishonest behavior such as lying occurs in the absence of 
conscious intervention.
To respond to the third question, we have focused on the 
prime which is caused by politicians (hereafter, referred to 
as. politician-priming). Politician-priming is particularly 
important nowadays, especially when many political lead-
ers are blamed for unethical behavior such as lying and 
corruption. Generally speaking, people feel that politicians 
are liars. The first example is: David Cameron (2010–2016 
Prime Minister, UK) was first voted for his honesty and 
upright characters, but he was being investigated for scan-
dals later on, i.e., he first lied to the general public about his 
innocence of no involvement in offshore activities, but he 
soon admitted that he had received profit (£30,000) from 
his father’s offshore investment fund (Independent, 2016). 
Another example is French citizens distrust their political 
leaders; only 25% of the national population trust their gov-
ernment and 87% regard their politicians with distrust and 
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disgust (Barometer of Political Trust, 2013). The third exam-
ple is more general that the public tends to describe politi-
cians as untrustworthy and dishonest, e.g., politicians look 
after their personal interests more than their public interests 
(Independent, 2016).
In view of what has preceded, when people perceive poli-
ticians as liars, can such perception lead to lying? Perhaps, 
we are unable to answer this question directly, but Dijkster-
huis and van Knippenberg (2000) have provided some valu-
able insights, which may help to answer the question. They 
have discovered that self-focus makes alternative behavio-
ral cues salient, which then leads to active inhibition of the 
stereotype and its effects on behavior. They state that auto-
matic effects of environment (e.g., society events, stereotype, 
work ethos) can guide people’s behavior in the absence of 
conscious intervention, but the effects may be compromised 
sometimes. Following this logic, when people regard poli-
ticians as liars, their opinion has a potential to affect their 
subsequent behavior, such as lying. More specifically, poli-
ticians often rationalize their lying behavior, so that lying 
seems to become less guilty and more society-acceptable, 
e.g., politicians often argue that I lie because there is a good 
reason behind or I lie to protect national security. Lying has 
a merit and lying seems not so guilty as long as there is a 
good reason behind it (Blake, 2013). We are of the view that 
this rationalization process has provided a good credence 
to support the relationship between politician-priming and 
lying; that is, when people see politicians justifying their lies 
with a rationale, people may engage in lying (politicians lie 
so can I).
Research design and hypothesis
Inspired by the prime theories and priming-cognate studies, 
we have examined the potential prime–lying relationship 
and proposed an innovative hypothesis that politicians make 
people lie via the priming effect. In this research, we have 
conducted a series of experiments to examine the hypothesis, 
using different types of primes. These primes include: politi-
cians, non-politicians (e.g., clergymen), French presidents 
and French political parties. These primes are genuine and 
exist in reality; so, the selection of these primes appears 
sensible and shall contribute to the research ecological 
validity and interpretation of data analysis (similar research 
strategies are adopted in: Epley and Gilovich 1999; Smeets 
and Brenner 1995). More specifically, in Experiment 1, the 
influence of politician-priming and non-politician-priming 
on lying behavior is compared and analyzed. In Experiment 
2—Part A (2A), we aim to further examine the influence of 
politician-priming; so two presidents of the French Republic 
are used as primes in the study, including: François Hollande 
(incumbent at the time of experiment) and Nicolas Sarkozy 
(preceded). In Experiment 2—Part B (2B), we aim to scru-
tinize whether politician-priming is individual oriented or 
party oriented. To sum up, Experiments 1, 2A and 2B aim 
to jointly analyze the influence of politician-priming from 
different perspectives, and the findings will not only help 
to examine the research hypothesis, but also contribute to 
the knowledge of lying in the absence without conscious 
intervention.
Experiment 1
Sample
We recruited 110 participants who were both employees 
and part-time students, registered on business programs 
at a French business school. Participants held a variety of 
jobs from local public sector workers, retail employees and 
within SMEs. Participants were randomly assigned to the 
pre-determined conditions (details of the conditions are clar-
ified later). The mean ages and gender ratio of participants 
in each condition are shown in Table 1.
Design and procedure
To examine the influence of politician-priming on lying 
behavior, we conducted a series of experiments, in which 
participants played dice games in scenario-based conditions. 
Table 1  Profile of participants 
(Experiment 1) Baseline (no prime effect)
Non-politician-prime (clergy-
men-prime effect)
Politician-prime 
(politician-prime 
effect)
N 41 34 35
Age
 Means 20.43 18.85 20.14
 Std. dev 0.10 1.44 0.65
Gender ratio
 Females (%) 68.29 50.00 54.25
 Males (%) 31.71 50.00 45.75
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Scenario-based design often has been adopted for topics in 
which real-life testing would raise ethical concerns from 
stakeholders including university ethics boards (e.g., Celse 
et al., 2016; Shalvi, Handgraaf, & De Dreu, 2011). In the 
case of lying behavior, it would not be desirable to encour-
age this type of behavior in the workplace and observe any 
effects. Thus, scenario-based design offers an opportunity 
to scrutinize the behavior of participants in a quasi-exper-
iment setting whilst removing the ethical issues (Sansone 
et al. 2004). Following this logic, Experiment 1 crafted three 
scenario-based conditions. These were:
baseline, in which participants received no prime 
effect;
politician-prime, in which participants received poli-
tician-prime effect; and finally
Non-politician-prime, in which participants received 
clergy-prime effect.
With respect to the experimental procedure, when par-
ticipants arrived at the laboratory (experiment site), they 
were randomly assigned to individual cubicles. Each per-
son was assigned to either baseline, politician-prime or 
non-politician-prime condition, i.e., one person stayed in 
one condition only. Participants then received instruction 
sheets, subject to their assigned conditions (details of con-
dition manipulation are clarified later). Within each condi-
tion, apart from the given instruction sheets, all participants 
received the same information again from their cubicle mon-
itors and speakers (this design ensured that everyone in the 
same condition received the same information; the audio- 
and visual-based information also enhanced the efficacy of 
instructions, facilitating participants to play dice games).
All participants were told that they would participate 
in a series of dice games and their performance would be 
recorded for the purpose of future data analysis and post-
experiment rewards, i.e., higher dice readings equate to more 
monetary rewards (#1 = €1). An administrator was also pre-
sent throughout the dice games to provide general support 
to the participants.
During the instruction, five participants were randomly 
selected to play dice games and read aloud their dice read-
ings. This arrangement not only helped participants to 
familiarize themselves with dice games, but also ensured 
participants that their dices were normal, genuine and not 
cheating-device embedded. After the instruction session, 
dice games started. Participants were invited to shake the 
dice in the cup and record the readings on the answer sheet. 
At this stage, participants only understood that they were 
expected to play dice games, but they did not know how 
many rounds of games they played. Specifically, the first two 
rounds of dice games were pilot exercises only, whereas the 
third round of game was used for data analysis. The rationale 
behind the design was to tackle with the bias of end-game 
effects on data interpretation, so hat the end-game effect 
could be prevented (Chang, 2012). When the third round of 
dice games was completed, participants were told that their 
dice games had finished. They immediately returned their 
equipment (dice and cup) to the administrator, so that no 
one could know the outcome of the third round of games. 
Participants were then requested to leave the laboratory, with 
a copy of the briefing sheet, revealing the true purpose of 
the research. Finally, after completing a short questionnaire 
(details will be clarified later), participants were paid in cash 
(based on their self-reported dice readings, #1 = €1 … #6 = 
€6) and thanked for their efforts in the experiment.
Probability of lying
Across three conditions, participants played a variant of 
the conventional dice-under-cup paradigm, i.e., a dice was 
placed inside an opaque cup and there was a peephole lid 
on the top (see similar design in: Shalvi et al. 2011; Weisel 
and Shalvi 2015). This design allowed participants to see 
dice readings through the peephole and only the participants 
could see the actual readings. Celse et al. (2016) comment 
that such design has incurred a probability of lying, as par-
ticipants can choose to lie (reporting higher readings to gain 
higher earnings) and not lie (reporting actual readings). This 
is because the statistical probability of reporting a specific 
reading (from #1 to #6) is one in six and hence 16.67%. 
If a specific reading appeared more often, say, the appear-
ance of #6 is higher than the average probability (16.67%), 
we believe such phenomenon shall be regarded as a sign of 
lying. Yet, we should not underestimate the possibility that 
someone may get #6 all the time, so we will evaluate this 
possibility and discuss its implication later.
Manipulation of prime conditions
Experiment 1 crafted different scenarios to activate different 
primes, allowing researchers to observe the effect of differ-
ent primes on lying behavior. Details follow.
Politician-prime Participants received politician-prime 
effect in this condition. Prior to the dice games, participants 
received the following instruction:
“Please use the provided sheet of paper to describe the 
characteristics of politicians. You are free to express 
your opinions and comment politicians’ characteris-
tics in your own way. This sheet of paper belongs to 
you and will not be collected by the administrator, so 
the anonymity of your views is guaranteed. You are 
encouraged to write as many characteristics as you can 
on this sheet of paper. You have five minutes for this 
task”.
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Non-politician-prime (clergymen-prime) This condi-
tion adopted the same instruction as above with one excep-
tion: we replaced politicians by clergymen. The rationale 
included: (1) compared to politicians, he general public 
tends to describe clergymen more positively (e.g., higher 
moral standards, less dishonest behaviors); so clergymen 
seem to be a sensible contrast to politicians (see similar 
manipulation in: Mazar et al., in which participants were 
primed with religious/moral reminders and their dishonest 
behavior then decreased); (2) clergymen are common across 
societies and different types of religions, so clergymen shall 
not be regarded as artificial stimuli and cause bias in experi-
ments; and finally (3) the arrangement of non-politician-
prime (clergymen-prime in this case) shall help examine 
the efficacy of prime activation and manipulation: when the 
prime activation and manipulation is successful, lying occur-
rence shall be lower in the non-politician-prime condition 
(compared to the baseline or politician-prime conditions). 
For the convenience of data analysis and comparison across 
conditions, non-politician-prime is renamed as clergymen-
prime in the following discussion.
Baseline Participants received no prime activation in this 
condition and hence no prime manipulation was needed. 
Baseline condition acted as a control group, aiming to com-
pare the influence of different primes on lying occurrence. 
For instance, if lying occurrence varies (either increase or 
decrease) in the politician-prime condition, baseline condi-
tion can help comparison across three conditions.
Manipulation check Although prime manipulation and 
dice games were arranged separately, we examined whether 
participants connected the two via a post-experiment ques-
tionnaire and a debriefing session. Results showed that no 
participant made such connection and so the chance of 
causal bias was slim, indicating a successful manipulation.
Findings of Experiment 1
Reported outcomes of the three conditions
We inspected any signs of lying behavior by examining the 
distribution of reported outcomes (dice readings) of the 
three conditions, including: baseline, politician-prime and 
clergymen-prime (see Fig. 1 for details). As a dice has six 
sides, the probability of reporting a specific number (from 
#1 to #6) is one in six, i.e., 16.67%. Interestingly, the prob-
ability of reporting #6 is 36.59% in baseline, 20.00% in 
politician-prime and 17.65% in clergymen-prime. These 
figures are higher than the probability (16.67%), implying 
signs of lying, i.e., participants may have lied in reporting 
their dice readings.
In baseline and politician-prime, readings of lower num-
bers on the dice (i.e., #1 and #2) were reported less fre-
quently (less than probability), whereas higher readings (i.e., 
#5 and #6) were reported more frequently (more than prob-
ability). The lower readings in baseline and politician-prime 
appeared consistently less than the probability (16.67%), 
including: #1 (baseline 4.88%, politician-prime 8.57%) and 
#2 (baseline 4.88%, politician-prime 14.29%). Conversely, 
higher readings in baseline and politician-prime conditions 
appeared consistently more than the probability (16.67%), 
including: #5 (baseline 36.59%, politician-prime 34.29%) 
and #6 (baseline 36.59%, politician-prime 20.00%).
The phenomenon that bigger dice readings (i.e., #5 and 
#6) were reported more often may be explained by two 
Fig. 1  Distribution of dice read-
ings in Experiment 1
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assumptions: (1). participants lied in reporting their dice 
readings and, (2) participants were indeed lucky to roll out 
bigger numbers. To further examine these assumptions, fur-
ther analyses were adopted to examine the distribution of 
reported readings. To be exact, significant differences across 
readings #1 to #6 were identified at baseline (Kolmogo-
rov–Smirnov, D = 0.532, p = 0.001, p < 0.01), indicating 
that the distribution of the reported readings deviated from 
uniform distribution (note: uniform distribution is based on a 
principle that the readings from #1 to #6 are equally distrib-
uted). Significant differences across readings #1 to #6 were 
also identified in politician-prime (Kolmogorov–Smirnov, 
D = 0.343, p = 0.001, p < 0.01).
This phenomenon suggested that participants in baseline 
and politician-prime lied, i.e., they reported bigger numbers 
(rather than being lucky to roll out bigger numbers). Inter-
estingly, no significant differences were observed in cler-
gymen-prime (Kolmogorov–Smirnov, D = 0.176, p = 0.240, 
p > 0.1), indicating that participants in clergymen-prime did 
not lie in their dice readings. An alternative interpretation 
is: when participants in clergymen-prime reported bigger 
readings, their readings were genuine and hence they were 
not lying. This finding has echoed a prior study that moral 
reminders act as a lying barrier, refraining dishonest behav-
ior (Mazar et al. 2008). To sum, the results above jointly 
support the view that participants lied in the baseline and 
politician-prime and that participants were less likely to lie 
in clergymen-prime.
Evaluation of prime effect
We examined the prime effect by comparing the distribu-
tion of dice readings across conditions. The distribution of 
dice readings between baseline and politician-prime was not 
significantly different (Kolmogorov–Smirnov, D = 0.225, p = 
0.245, p > 0.1). The distribution of dice readings between 
politician-prime and clergymen-prime was not significantly 
different (Kolmogorov–Smirnov, D = 0.189, p = 0.469, 
p > 0.1). The average rewards were €4.057 in politician-
prime and €3.676 in clergymen-prime. Participants in 
politician-prime (M = €4.057, SD = 1.643) did not report 
significantly higher readings than participants in clergymen-
prime (M = €3.673, SD = 1.700) (Mann–Whitney, p = 0.334, 
p > 0.1).
However, the distribution of dice readings between 
baseline and clergymen-prime was significantly different 
(Kolmogorov–Smirnov, D = 0.378, p = 0.001, p < 0.01), 
indicating that participants lied more in baseline than cler-
gymen-prime. The average rewards were €4.804 in baseline 
and €3.676 in clergymen-prime. Participants in baseline 
(M = €4.804, SD = 1.382) reported significantly bigger 
dice readings than participants in clergymen-prime (M = 
€3.673, SD = 1.700) (Mann–Whitney, p = 0.002, p < 0.01), 
indicating that lying behavior was lower in clergymen-prime 
(in comparison to baseline). To sum up, clergymen-prime 
was successful as it generated a significant effect on partici-
pants’ lying behavior. When participants were primed with 
clergymen identity, they were less likely to report big dice 
readings and the distribution of readings was also closer to 
the probability.
Evaluation of personal characters
At the end of the dice games, participants were invited to 
rate the subject that they chose in the game. Three ques-
tions were instructed to the participants via an anonymous 
questionnaire survey, and their responses were recorded on 
a seven-point Likert scale. These questions were: “In terms 
of trust, how would you rate the subject that you chose in the 
game? (1 = not trustworthy at all, 7 = completely trustwor-
thy)”, “In terms of honesty, how would you rate the subject 
that you chose in the game? (1 = not honesty at all, 7 = com-
pletely honesty)” and “In terms of admiration, how would 
you rate the subject that you chose in the game?” (1 = I do 
not admire the subject at all, 7 = I admire the subject com-
pletely). Further statistical analysis was carried out and the 
results were as follows.
Level of trust Participants in clergymen-prime (M = 4.794, 
SD = 1.409) and politician-prime (M = 2.771, SD = 1.373) 
showed significant difference in their ratings (Mann–Whit-
ney, p = 0.001, p < 0.01). These figures indicated that par-
ticipants in clergymen-prime described their subject with 
higher level of trust.
Level of honesty Participants in clergymen-prime 
(M = 5.470, SD = 1.211) and politician-prime (M = 3.285, 
SD = 1.446) showed significant difference in their ratings 
(Mann–Whitney, p = 0.001, p < 0.01). These figures indi-
cated that participants in clergymen-prime described their 
subject with a higher level of honesty.
Level of admiration Participants in clergymen-prime 
(M = 3.764, SD = 1.596) and politician-prime (M = 3.285, 
SD = 1.601) did not show difference in their ratings 
(Mann–Whitney, p = 0.226). Yet, clergymen-prime’s ratings 
were still higher than the middle point of seven-point Lik-
ert scale (Mdiff = 0.264), whereas politician-prime’s ratings 
were lower than the middle point (Mdiff = − 0.215).
To sum up, participants perceived clergymen to be more 
positive and politicians less positive; for instance, partici-
pants rated clergymen with a higher level of trust and hon-
esty (compared to politicians). It is therefore reasonable to 
argue that the effect of clergymen-prime has triggered a 
sense of moral reminder (or commandment); so participants 
are less likely to lie when they report their dice readings. 
More specifically, except for the participants in clergymen-
prime, participants in baseline and politician-prime showed 
signs of lying. This phenomenon is meaningful in several 
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ways: (1) participants in clergymen-prime showed no sign 
of lying and hence they were the most honest participants 
in the dice games. This finding is dovetailed to our research 
expectations; (2) participants in baseline lied because they 
were exposed to an opportunity of lying and lying brings 
them benefits: this finding is coherent with prior studies of 
lying incentives (Evans and Lee 2013; Bok 1999); (3) partic-
ipants in politician-prime lied but their lying occurrence was 
lower than those in baseline: this finding is intrigue as there 
is no significant difference (of lying occurrence) between 
politician-prime and baseline, and between politician-prime 
and clergymen-prime.
As shown in Fig. 1, the lying occurrence in politician-
prime is approximately situated between baseline and cler-
gymen-prime (see exact figures of #5 and #6 in Fig. 1). Such 
result has challenged our understanding of prime effect on 
lying occurrence, but we hereby propose an assumption to 
interpret the result: Before rolling the dice, some partici-
pants may choose a politician they like (e.g., a honest and 
moral one) and so the prime effect reinforces their conse-
quent honest behavior, whereas others may choose a politi-
cian they dislike (e.g., a dishonest and immoral one) and so 
the prime effect reinforces dishonesty behavior. Our assump-
tion is plausible in essence and will be further examined in 
Experiment 2A.
Experiment 2—part A (2A)
Experiment 1 activated politician-prime and observed its 
impact on lying behavior. Although the findings are valu-
able, a limitation is that the identity of politicians is uncer-
tain and uncontrollable, incurring bias(es) in data analysis. 
For instance, people may not necessarily describe politicians 
negatively, as the perception and evaluation of politicians 
may depend upon the selected politicians. To overcome this 
limitation, Experiment 2A refined the research scope by nar-
rowing the influence of politicians to the individual level. 
Following this logic, two recent presidents of the French 
Republic were used as primes. These were: François Hol-
lande (incumbent at the time of experiment; 2012–2017) and 
Nicolas Sarkozy (preceded; 2007–2012). Emmanuel Macron 
(incumbent; 2017–2022) was elected after the experiment 
(May 2017) and hence not considered for the purpose of 
prime.
The arrangement of president-prime was based on four 
reasons. (1). Participants are French citizens and native 
French speakers. They live and work in France and so it is 
reasonable to assume that both presidents are familiar faces 
to participants, i.e., both presidents are clear identity sub-
jects to participants. (2). Hollande and Sarkozy belong to 
different political parties (Socialist Party vs. The Repub-
licans). They are different in their political orientation 
(left wing vs. right wing), i.e., Hollande and Sarkozy have 
different political identity and characters from the partici-
pants. (3). Nearly 75% of the French citizens distrust their 
government, especially the presidents, e.g., Sarkozy was 
accused of lying and failing to take responsibility in a scan-
dal over the funding of his 2012 presidential campaign, 
whereas Hollande was accused of dodging tax and lying in 
his relationships with females (Barometer of Political Trust, 
2013); and, (4W). The president is the legal representation 
of public authority, such as the leader of the state. Analyzing 
president-activated prime helps us to examine the research 
hypothesis, i.e., whether politicians make people lie.
Sample
We recruited 72 participants who were both employees and 
part-time students, registered on business programs at a 
French business school. These participants did not attend 
Experiment 1 and hence had no repeat-effect bias. Partici-
pants held a variety of jobs from local public sector workers, 
retail employees and within SMEs. Participants were ran-
domly assigned to the pre-determined conditions (details of 
the conditions are clarified later). The mean ages and gender 
ratio of participants in each condition are shown in Table 2.
Design and procedure
Experiment 2A adopted Experiment 1’s design and proce-
dure to measure the effect of primes.
Manipulation of prime conditions
Experiment 2A crafted two conditions to activate different 
primes, allowing researchers to observe the effect of differ-
ent primes on lying behavior. Details follow.
Sarkozy-prime Participants received Sarkozy-prime 
effect in this condition. Prior to the dice games, participants 
received the following instruction:
“Please use the provided sheet of paper to describe the 
characteristics of President Sarkozy. You are free to 
Table 2  Profile of participants (Experiment 2A)
Sarkozy-prime Hollande-prime
N 36 36
Age
 Means 21.73 20.36
 Std. dev 1.23 1.02
Gender ratio
 Females (%) 54.25 38.84
 Males (%) 45.75 61.16
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express your opinions and comment Sarkozy’ charac-
teristics in your own way. Your opinions and comment 
should be about Sarkozy. This sheet of paper belongs 
to you and will not be collected by the administrator, 
so the anonymity of your views is guaranteed. You 
are encouraged to write as many characteristics as you 
can on this sheet of paper. You have five minutes for 
this task”.
Hollande-prime This condition adopted the same instruc-
tion as above, but with one exception: Sarkozy was replaced 
by Hollande.
Manipulation check Experiment 2A adopted Experiment 
1’s examination method and the results indicated a success-
ful manipulation.
Findings of experiment 2—part A (2A)
Reported outcomes of two conditions
We inspected any signs of lying behavior by examining the 
distribution of reported outcomes (dice readings) of the two 
conditions (Sarkozy-prime vs. Hollande-prime). We discov-
ered significant difference between Sarkozy-prime and Hol-
lande-prime (Kolmogorov–Smirnov, D = 0.333, p = 0.022, 
p < 0.05). The probability of reporting bigger dice readings 
was higher in Sarkozy-prime (#5 = 22.22% ; #6 = 47.22%) 
and lower in Hollande-prime (#5 = 2.78%; #6 = 33.33%). 
The probability in Sarkozy-prime was higher than that in 
theory, probably ‘[probabilitydiff (#5) = 5.55%;  probabilitydiff 
(#6) = 30.55%], implying signs of lying, i.e., participants in 
Sarkozy-prime lied when reporting their dice readings (see 
Fig. 2 for details).
In Sarkozy-prime, the probability for each dice read-
ing was: #1 (8.33%), #2 (2.78%), #3 (5.56%), #4 (13.89%), 
#5 (22.22%) and #6 (47.22%). These probability figures 
showed a general ascending trend from smaller dice read-
ings to bigger readings. In Hollande-prime, such ascending 
trend did not emerge, as the probability for each reading 
was: #1 (8.33%), #2 (19.44%), #3 (16.67%), #4 (19.44%), 
#5 (2.78%) and #6 (33.33%). Further analysis showed that 
Sarkozy-prime and Hollande-prime showed different dice 
reading distributions (χ2 = 13.14, p = 0.022, p < 0.05), indi-
cating that participants in Sarkozy-prime were more inclined 
to report bigger dice readings (more lying behavior) whereas 
participants in Hollande-prime did not show this inclination.
The average dice readings in Sarkozy-prime were 4.805, 
which were equal to €4.805 in reward. The average dice 
readings in Hollande-prime were 3.888, which were equal 
to €3.888 in reward. The average reward in Sarkozy-prime 
(M = €4.805, SD = 1.564) was higher than that of Hol-
lande-prime (M = €3.888, SD = 1.789) (Mann–Whitney, 
p = 0.031, p < 0.05), indicating that participants in Sarkozy-
prime reported big dice readings (i.e., #5 and #6) more often 
than the participants in Hollande-prime. This phenomenon 
may be explained by two assumptions: (1) participants lied 
in reporting their dice readings and, (2) participants were 
indeed lucky to roll out big numbers.
To further examine these assumptions, further analyses 
continued. First, significant differences across readings #1 to 
#6 were identified in Sarkozy-prime (Kolmogorov–Smirnov, 
D = 0.494, p = 0.0002, p < 0.01), indicating that the distribu-
tion of reported readings deviated from uniform distribu-
tion. Significant differences across readings #1 to #6 were 
Fig. 2  Distribution of dice read-
ings in Experiment 2 (part one)
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also identified in Hollande-prime (Kolmogorov–Smirnov, 
D = 0.333, p = 0.001, p < 0.01). This phenomenon suggested 
that participants in both Sarkozy-prime and Hollande-prime 
lied, i.e., they reported bigger numbers (rather than being 
lucky to roll out bigger numbers). Yet, when comparing 
the probability of bigger dice readings (#5 and #6) between 
the two conditions, more signs of lying behavior appeared 
in Sarkozy-prime [probability (#5) = 22.22%; probability 
(#6) = 47.22%; average = 34.72%] than in Hollande-prime 
[probability (#5) = 2.78%; probability (#6) = 33.33%; 
average = 18.06%].
By comparing the probability of smaller dice readings (#1 
and #2) between the two conditions, we found more signs of 
lying behavior in Sarkozy-prime [probability (#1) = 8.33%; 
probability (#2) = 2.78%; average = 5.56%] than in Hollande-
prime [probability (#1) = 8.33%; probability (#2) = 19.44%; 
average = 13.89%]. These statistical figures indicated that 
participants in Sarkozy-prime increasingly reported bigger 
dice readings to get more rewards, but decreasingly reported 
smaller readings to avoid losing their rewards (compared 
to the participants in Hollande-prime). To sum up, partici-
pants in Sarkozy-prime reported bigger dice readings than 
participants in Hollande-prime. They also reported big 
readings more frequently than their counterparts: namely, 
Sarkozy-prime leads to more lying behavior, both in gravity 
(i.e., bigger dice numbers) and frequency (i.e., lying more 
frequently).
Experiment 2—part B (2B)
Experiment 2A discovered that Sarkozy-prime led to lying 
behavior both in gravity and frequency. This finding is valu-
able, but the mechanism of prime is not clear and hence 
requires further examination. Participants may evaluate 
Sarkozy negatively and then associate him with dishonest 
characteristics, in which Sarkozy-prime activates the ten-
dency of dishonesty behavior (lying of bigger dice read-
ings). Yet, as Sarkozy was the leader of Union for a Popu-
lar Movement (UMP) and The Republicans (note. UMP was 
founded in 2002 and renamed The Republicans in 2015), it 
is also reasonable to assume that participants may associate 
Sarkozy with his political right wing party and therefore the 
influence of Sarkozy-prime is actually based on the evalua-
tion of The Republicans, rather than Sarkozy per se. In view 
of what preceded, Experiment 2B was conducted to examine 
the mechanism of Sarkozy-prime and its influence on lying 
behavior. Specifically, Experiment 2B aimed to scrutinize 
whether politician-priming was individual oriented or party 
oriented.
Sample
Several weeks after Experiment 2A, the same group of par-
ticipants attended Experiment 2B, by which participants 
were exposed to a new prime (i.e., Republicans-prime). 
Participants were randomly assigned into pre-determined 
conditions (details of the conditions are clarified later). 
The mean ages and gender ratio of participants are shown 
in Table 3.
Design and procedure
Experiment 2B adopted Experiment 1’s design and proce-
dure to measure the effect of primes.
Manipulation of prime conditions
Experiment 2B observed how different primes (Sarkozy-
prime vs. Republicans-prime) affected lying behavior. 72 
participants were randomly assigned to either Sarkozy-
prime condition or Republicans-prime condition; so 
there were 36 participants in each condition. As partici-
pants were exposed to Sarkozy-prime in Experiment 2A, 
researchers decided not to arrange Sarkozy-prime in the 
manipulation, to reduce the influence of repeat-effect 
bias in Experiment 2B. For the same reason, participants 
who were assigned to the Sarkozy-prime condition were 
requested to leave the experiment and thanked for their 
participation.
Participants who were assigned to the Republicans-prime 
condition continued in the experiment. Prior to the dice 
games, participants received the following instruction:
“Please use the provided sheet of paper to describe 
the characteristics of The Republicans Party. You 
are free to express your opinions and comment in 
your own way. Your opinions and comment should 
Table 3  Profile of participants (Experiment 2B)
Sarkozy-prime Republicans-
prime (right wing 
party)
N 36 36
Age
 Means 21.53 20.50
 Std. dev 1.05 0.23
Gender ratio
 Females (%) 58.83 36.11
 Males (%) 41.17 63.89
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be about The Republicans Party. This sheet of 
paper belongs to you and will not be collected by 
the administrator, so the anonymity of your views 
is guaranteed. You are encouraged to write as many 
characteristics as you can on this sheet of paper. You 
have five minutes for this task”.
Manipulation check Experiment 2B adopted Experiment 1’s 
examination method and the results indicated a successful 
manipulation.
Findings of Experiment 2—part B (2B)
Reported outcomes of the two conditions
We inspected any signs of lying behavior by examining the 
distribution of reported outcomes (dice readings) in the 
two conditions, i.e., Sarkozy-prime (findings from Experi-
ment 2A) and Republicans-prime (findings from Experi-
ment 2B). We discovered no difference between Sarkozy-
prime and Republicans-prime (Kolmogorov–Smirnov, 
D = 0.184, p = 0.510, p > 0.100). However, the probability 
of reporting bigger dice readings was high in Republicans-
prime (#6 = 33.33%) and even higher in Sarkozy-prime 
(#5 = 22.22% ; #6 = 47.22%). The probability of report-
ing smaller dice readings was low in Republicans-prime 
(#1 = 13.89%; #2 = 5.56%) and even lower in Sarkozy-prime 
(#1 = 8.33%; #2 = 2.78%).
These statistical figures jointly have suggested the signs 
of lying, i.e., participants from both conditions lied in report-
ing their dice readings (see Fig. 3 for details). Specifically, 
in Sarkozy-prime, the probability for each dice reading 
was: #1 (8.33%), #2 (2.78%), #3 (5.56%), #4 (13.89%), 
#5 (22.22%) and #6 (47.22%). These probability figures 
showed a general ascending trend from smaller dice read-
ings to bigger readings. Significant differences across read-
ings #1 to #6 were identified in Sarkozy-prime (Kolmogo-
rov–Smirnov, D = 0.494, p = 0.0002, p < 0.01), indicating 
that the distribution of the reported readings deviated from 
uniform distribution. In Republicans-prime, such ascend-
ing trend also emerged, as the probability for each reading 
was: #1 (13.89%), #2 (5.56%), #3 (13.89%), #4 (16.67%), #5 
(16.67%) and #6 (33.33%). Differences across readings #1 
to #6 were also identified in Republicans-prime (Kolmogo-
rov–Smirnov, D = 0.333, p = 0.001, p < 0.01), indicating that 
the distribution of the reported readings deviated from uni-
form distribution. Namely, the phenomenon that bigger dice 
readings were reported in both conditions (Sarkozy-prime 
and Republican-prime) was due to lying behaviors rather 
than being lucky to roll out bigger numbers. Participants 
from Sarkozy-prime and Republicans-prime both showed 
lying behavior.
Evaluation of Sarkozy‑prime and Republicans‑prime
The average dice readings in Sarkozy-prime were 4.805, 
which was equal to €4.805 in rewards. The average dice 
readings in Republicans-prime were 4.166, which was equal 
to €4.166 in rewards. The average rewards between Repub-
licans-prime (M = €4.166, SD = 1.769) and Sarkozy-prime 
(M = €4.805, SD = 1.564) were not significant (Mann–Whit-
ney, p = 0.334, p > 0.100). Yet, when comparing the prob-
ability of bigger dice readings (#5 and #6) between the 
two conditions, we can see more signs of lying behavior 
Fig. 3  Distribution of dice read-
ings in Experiment 2 (part two)
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in Sarkozy-prime [probability (#5) = 22.22%; probability 
(#6) = 47.22%; average = 34.72%) than in Republicans-prime 
(probability (#5) = 16.67%; probability (#6) = 33.33%; aver-
age = 25.00%). By comparing the probability of smaller dice 
readings (#1 and #2) between the two conditions, we found 
more signs of lying behavior in Sarkozy-prime (probability 
(#1) = 8.33%; probability (#2) = 2.78%; average = 5.56%) 
than in Republicans-prime [probability (#1) = 13.89%; 
probability (#2) = 5.56%; average = 9.73%]. Participants 
in Sarkozy-prime increasingly reported bigger dice read-
ings to get more rewards; simultaneously, they decreasingly 
reported smaller readings to avoid losing their rewards (com-
pared to the participants in Republicans-prime). To sum up, 
Republicans-prime yielded an impact on more lying behav-
ior, and Sarkozy-prime made such impact even stronger.
Discussion and conclusion
Do politicians make people lie? Do presidents exert an 
influence on the tendency of lying? Inspired by the prime 
theories, we proposed an innovative hypothesis that peo-
ple who perceive politicians to be dishonest are likely to lie 
themselves. In this research, we conducted a series of experi-
ments to examine the influence of politicians on lying occur-
rence via different primes. Experiment 1 discovered that par-
ticipants with non-politician-prime (i.e., clergymen-prime) 
were less likely to lie, and that participants in clergymen-
prime described their subject with a higher level of trust 
and honesty. In contrast, participants in politician-prime 
described their subject with a lower level of trust and hon-
esty. Experiment 2A discovered that, compared to Hollande-
prime, Sarkozy-prime led to lying behavior both in gravity 
(i.e., bigger lies) and frequency (i.e., lying more frequently). 
Experiment 2B discovered that Republicans-prime yielded 
an impact on more lying behavior, and Sarkozy-prime made 
such impact even stronger. Overall, findings have helped to 
explain that lying can be triggered by external influencers 
such as presidents and politicians, i.e., politicians do make 
people lie. Three experiments jointly have provided an alter-
native perspective to the conventional view of lying as con-
scious-driven or self-protection behavior and hence our find-
ings are valuable. The implications of our research findings 
and suggestions for lying intervention are discussed further.
Contribution to the knowledge of lying behavior
Lying seems to be a ubiquitous behavior across societies and 
Serota et al. (2010) describe lying as a social ability, which 
is essential for polite interaction and self-preservation. In 
a similar vein, other scholars regard lying as an intentional 
behavior, lying is the outcome of pay-off evaluation/calcula-
tion, and lying brings interests to the liar (e.g., Beck, 1968; 
Bok 1999; DePaulo 2004). Following this logic, one may 
argue that lying is a conscious and intentional behavior, and 
liars lie because they want to lie. Following the prime theo-
ries, however, we suggest a different view that lying is not 
necessarily a conscious and intentional behavior and lying 
is possible to occur in the absence of conscious intervention. 
We have learned from literature review that human behavior 
can be initiated automatically by presenting relevant situ-
ational cues (primes) with the mediation of non-conscious 
perceptual or evaluative processes (Meyer and Schvaneveldt 
1971). In this research, we therefore examined the concept 
of prime and its potential influence on lying behavior. We 
also examined the impact of primes on lying occurrence 
by manipulating different types of primes. In sum, research 
hypotheses were in accordance with our expectations and 
overall findings have contributed to the knowledge of lying 
behavior, especially in the field of unintentional lying.
As mentioned in prior studies that lying is often classi-
fied as a conscious behavior, our findings have provided an 
alternative perspective that lying may occur unintentionally 
and liars may not be aware of the fact that they are lying. 
In Experiment 1, politicians-prime and clergymen-prime 
exerted difference in inducing lying behavior (supported by 
statistics), in which clergymen-prime helped to refrain lying 
occurrence but such refraining effect on lying did not exist 
in politician-prime. This refraining effect has also echoed 
the evaluation of subjects in prime-conditions, e.g., par-
ticipants in clergymen-prime described their subject with 
a higher level of trust and honesty, whereas participants in 
politicians-prime described their subject with a lower level 
of trust and honesty. In Experiment 2A, although partici-
pants from both Sarkozy-prime and Hollande-prime lied, 
statistical analysis has suggested that Sarkozy-prime led to 
lying behavior both in gravity (i.e., bigger dice numbers) 
and frequency (i.e., lying more frequently). In Experi-
ment 2B, although participants from Sarkozy-prime and 
Republicans-prime both lied, participant in Sarkozy-prime 
reported bigger dice readings more often. Statistical analy-
sis has suggested that Sarkozy-prime effect may originate 
from Sarkozy, rather than his political party. Across the three 
experiments, all findings have made it clear that when people 
perceive politicians to be dishonest, they are likely to lie. For 
the same reason, we are of the view that politicians do have 
a chance to make people lie.
Limitations and future research
Although we claim that politicians may make people lie 
through unconscious priming effect, our claim should be 
interpreted with caution. In reality, people may perceive the 
same politician differently and hence their evaluation varies, 
implying that the influence of politician-prime on lying may 
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not be universal. The possibility of conscious lying behav-
ior still exists, as participants may deliberate to get more 
rewards (more lying) in the experiments. Future studies are 
encouraged to develop more complex research design, so 
that both conscious and unconscious lying behavior could 
be examined simultaneously.
Due to the limited research fund, only two experiments 
with fixed number of participants were conducted. The limi-
tation in participant recruitment may affect the effect size 
and undermine the legitimacy of the statistical power. Future 
studies may extend our research scope and enlarge the par-
ticipant pool to achieve more robust and reliable research 
findings. Next, the current research defines unconscious 
lying as lying without individual awareness. This definition 
may receive criticism if unconscious lying were actually 
triggered by self-serving inclination; for instance, lying may 
be triggered by personal values and the liar may not neces-
sarily be aware of the lying behavior. Future studies may 
further examine this type of inclination and its implication 
to lying behaviour.
In terms of prime manipulation, Experiment 2A adopted 
two French presidents as primes. President is often the head 
of state (e.g. supreme leader or representative of the entire 
country) and hence has a great distance to general pub-
lic (compared to local councillors). Yet, whether distance 
affects priming effect (e.g., president-prime vs. councillor-
prime) was not measured in the research; so future studies 
are encouraged to examine this distance factor further.
In terms of political-prime, we did not measure vot-
ing orientation and its relevance to the level of support for 
Sarkozy or other candidates. A hindsight is perhaps voting 
orientation is a better predictor to lying behavior, e.g., if 
people perceive Sarkozy to be trustworthy and definitely 
vote for Sarkozy, they would be less likely to lie when they 
report their dice readings, and vice versa. In addition, we 
have claimed that Sarkozy-prime leads to lying behavior 
both in gravity and frequency and its prime effect may origi-
nate from Sarkozy, rather than his political party. Although 
our claims are supported by statistics, we shall not underesti-
mate the possibility that there might be other factor(s) which 
explain why Sarkozy-prime has a salient effect in inducing 
lying behavior. Probably, we just have not found it yet.
Practical implication to lying intervention
Our research has affirmed the importance of prime on behav-
ior and, specifically, we discovered the potential influence 
of politician-prime on lying behavior. Although mental rep-
resentation has been found to be crucial in human behav-
ior, scholars seem to have mixed views about why and how 
mental presentations work. For example, thinking about 
elderly makes people walk slower (Bargh et al. 1996), think-
ing about religious statements makes people more likely to 
be honest (Mazar et al. 2008), and thinking about finance-
related job makes people more likely to be dishonest if 
they were bankers (Cohen et al., 2014). Our research may 
not explain how and why mental presentation works in the 
examples above. However, our research has found statistical 
evidence to explain why and how lying can be triggered by 
external influencers such as presidents and politicians, and 
this provides an alternative perspective to the current view of 
lying as personal interest-driven or self-protection behavior. 
For the same reason, government leaders and organizational 
managers should be aware of the risk that they may become 
the source of lying behavior. One solution to rectify this is 
that governments, councils and general organizations should 
craft higher moral standards and HR policies for the recruit-
ment and appraisal of senior and executive members.
There are numerous studies explaining the positive 
impact of leaders on organizational performance, e.g., they 
motivate employees and facilitate teams to work more effi-
ciently (see a full review in: Yukl 2012). Different from prior 
findings that acclaim the importance of leaders, we argue 
that leaders may become the origins of negative evaluation 
(Supported by Experiment 1) and trigger lying behavior 
(Supported by Experiments 2A and 2B). In practice, organi-
zations can apply any lying intervention polities into their 
personnel training and management, but such policies prob-
ably will not reach the maximum efficacy if the organiza-
tion leader(s) are perceived and evaluated negatively by the 
majority of members in the organization. Applying more 
punitive polices (sanctions) helps to reduce lying occurrence 
temporarily, but such policies may also lead to other side 
effect (Celse et al., 2016). Following this logic and inspired 
by Experiment 1 that clergymen-prime helped to refrain 
lying occurrence, we hereby suggest organization leaders 
and business owners to attend corporate social reasonability 
and business ethics workshops on a regular basis, expos-
ing themselves to enterprise morality and ethics more often. 
Hopefully, these leaders and owners would benefit from the 
workshops and then exercise their leadership and manage-
ment with higher moral and ethical standards. Ultimately, 
with higher enterprise morality and business ethics in prac-
tice, organization leaders and business owners are less likely 
to be evaluated negatively and become the source of lying 
behavior.
Conclusion
This research analyzed whether political leaders make 
people lie via three priming experiments. We proposed 
an innovative concept that people who perceive lead-
ers to be dishonest (such as liar) are likely to lie them-
selves. Experiment 1 discovered that participants with 
non-politician-prime were less likely to lie (compared to 
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politician-prime). Experiment 2A discovered that, com-
pared to Hollande-prime, Sarkozy-prime led to lying 
behavior both in gravity (i.e., bigger lies) and frequency 
(i.e., lying more frequently). Experiment 2B discovered 
that Republicans-prime yielded an impact on more lying 
behavior, and Sarkozy-prime made such impact even 
stronger. The research findings suggest that lying can be 
triggered by external influencers such as leaders, presi-
dents and politicians in the organizations. Our findings 
have provided valuable insights into organizational lead-
ers and managers in their personnel management prac-
tice, especially in the intervention of lying behavior. Our 
findings also have offered new insights to explain non-
conscious lying behavior.
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